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Abstract
In the present paper a model of a market consisting of real and financial interacting
sectors is studied. Agents populating the stock market are assumed to be not able to
observe the true underlying fundamental, and their beliefs are biased by either optimism or
pessimism. Depending on the relevance they give to beliefs, they select the best performing
strategy in an evolutionary perspective. The real side of the economy is described within a
multiplier-accelerator framework with a nonlinear, bounded investment function. We show
that strongly polarized beliefs in an evolutionary framework can introduce multiplicity of
steady states, which, consisting in enhanced or depressed levels of income, reflect and
reproduce the optimistic or pessimistic nature of the agents’ beliefs. The polarization
of these steady states, which coexist with an unbiased steady state, positively depends
on that of the beliefs and on their relevance. Moreover, with a mixture of analytical
and numerical tools, we show that such static characterization is inherited also at the
dynamical level, with possibly complex attractors that are characterized by endogenously
fluctuating pessimistic and optimistic levels of national income and price. This framework,
when stochastic perturbations are included, is able to account for stylized facts commonly
observed in real financial markets, such as fat tails and excess volatility in the returns
distributions, as well as bubbles and crashes for stock prices.
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The 2008-2009 crisis stimulated new reflections on the origins and the causes of turmoil in the
economic environment. Accordingly, it turned out to be relevant the understanding of how in-
stability can reinforce and spread among different sectors, and of what are the factors that may
hinder their interaction. As a consequence of such complexity, agents populating the economic
system are often better represented as boundedly rational actors, mispricing risks and inappro-
priately evaluating the economic variables. This is usually at the source of instabilities, that
can make the economic system evolve in unpredictable ways, especially when non-deterministic
components are acting.
The research goal of the present paper is to improve the understanding of the effect that a bi-
ased evaluation of the economic variables may have on the resulting economic dynamics and
of whether an increase in the integration between the real and financial sectors is harmful or
beneficial to the economy. Relying on analytical investigations complemented by numerical
simulations, we study how a boundedly rational agents framework can give rise to multistability
phenomena in the economic system, and how the eventual related instability may spread between
the integrated markets.
1 Introduction
Seeking the explanations of the 2008-2009 crisis only within the real or the financial side of
the economy leads to a dead end way. The global response to the crisis in the form of fiscal
stimulus indeed awakened the interest in the multiplier-accelerator approach dating back to
[26], from which the modern business cycle theory originated. According to this scheme, en-
dogenous fluctuations spring in the economic activity as a consequence of the mutual interplay
between consumption, investments and national income changes, driven either by a multiplica-
tive component that links expenditures to national income (the so-called Keynesian multiplier)
or by the principle through which induced investments depend on the pace of growth in the
economic activity (the accelerator principle). The original model of [26] has been refined and
developed through the decades, emphasizing from time to time different aspects, ranging from
the role of the monetary sector or of the inventory adjustment to that of expectations in the
national income, or to the effect of bounded investment functions. A burgeoning literature has
been widely disseminating: we just mention the contributions in [7, 13, 14, 20, 24, 25].
However, the increasing relevance and influence of the financial side of the economy on the
real sector (the so-called phenomenon of financialization of the real economy) can not be ne-
glected, with the consequent need to investigate the interactions between the real and stock
subsystems. The related literature can be roughly divided into two research strands, where the
former sustains and describes the reverberations of the financial sector into the real one (as in
[6, 19, 21, 28]), while the latter, on the contrary, contains a support for the opposite influence
direction (see e.g. [1, 18, 19, 21]).
In the wake of the aforementioned discussion, the recent financial crisis strengthened the
need to understand the causes of turmoil in the economic environment, keeping a focus on
the role of the financial system. Among several factors, a systematic mispricing of risk is
commonly regarded as one of the underlying sources of instability for the economic environment.
The presence of such a bias, indeed, reflects a boundedly rational behavior of the involved
economic actors, who may have a rough knowledge of the economic fundamentals. This can
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lead agents to systematically overestimate or underestimate them, and to possibly stick to or
switch among different forecasting rules on the basis of simple heuristics. It is well-known (see
[14]) that bounded rationality together with heterogeneity is a potential source of endogenous
fluctuations in the dynamics of the relevant economic variables. An interesting consequence of
this modeling framework is also the capability to exhibit simulated time series characterized by
several qualitative properties, as leptokurtic returns distributions, large and clustered volatility,
that are distinctive features of real time series.
The present contribution belongs to the research strand on the study of interacting markets,
and embraces a modelling approach similar to those adopted in [4, 23, 28]. In particular, in
each of these works, the sources of complex dynamics are always clearly linked to and explained
through particular mathematical phenomena occurring in the model.
For example, in [28] a Keynesian-type goods real market is combined with a stock market pop-
ulated by heterogeneous fundamentalist and chartist agents. The main result is that the system
is characterized by different coexisting steady states, that can become unstable and give rise
to complex dynamics. From the mathematical point of view, we have persistent multistability
of stable steady states or of attractors characterized by similar degrees of complexity.
Conversely, in [23] it was deeply investigated the effect of coupling either stable and unstable
isolated real and stock markets. In this case, a Keynesian good market interacts with a stock
market characterized by optimistic and pessimistic agents, whose fractions can change over
time according to an evolutionary switching mechanism. Surprisingly, instabilities can not only
spread from one market to the other, but they can even arise by increasing the level of inter-
action between markets that are stable when isolated. From the mathematical viewpoint, this
is explained investigating the loss of stability and the kinds of consequent dynamics arising,
depending on the degree of interaction or on the degree of optimism/pessimism. Moreover, the
analysis of the resulting time series of the economic variables shows a significant deviation from
normality.
The work in [4] provides evidence that even a potentially stable economic system can show
endogenously fluctuating dynamics, since a locally stable steady state can coexist with other
complex attractors, so that the long-run dynamics are strongly path-dependent and can result
in sequences of alternating periods of persisting large or small volatility.
In all the above-mentioned papers, the agents’ heterogeneity and their boundedly rational
nature have no effects on the set of possible steady states, which always consists of a unique
steady state ([23, 4]) or of three coexisting steady states ([28]).
However, it is reasonable to wonder whether the boundedly rational nature of the agents can
also affect the final outcomes of the system in terms of existing steady states and their posi-
tion. In other words, we are interested in inquiring if, as a consequence of a biased evaluation
of economic variables, “biased” steady states can emerge. For example, may an excess of op-
timistic/pessimistic bias foster the emergence of “optimistic” and “pessimistic” steady states,
which, in turn, can evolve into optimistic and pessimistic complex attractors? Additionally, to
which extent the birth of biased steady states is affected by the markets’ integration?
In order to investigate these aspects, building on the approach pursued in the above men-
tioned contributions, we analyze an economy made by two, possibly interdependent, subsys-
tems, namely a real and a financial sector. The real sector essentially recalls the economy
presented in [4] and [24], in which a multiplier-accelerator model with a bounded investment
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function is studied, and it is coupled with a stock market populated by optimistic and pes-
simistic fundamentalists, modeled by following the approach in [23]. In so doing, we shall focus
our attention on the degree of interaction between markets, which positively depends on the
parameter ω ∈ [0, 1], as well as we shall take into account the role of agents’ beliefs, repre-
sented by a symmetric optimistic/pessimistic bias b > 0, and their willingness to switch toward
the best performing strategy while operating in the stock market, described by the so-called
intensity of choice β > 0 (see e.g. [14]) that regulates the evolutionary selection between fore-
casting rules. The resulting dynamics are described by a three-dimensional nonlinear system of
difference equations for which we analyze the existence and the stability of steady states and,
through global analysis, we investigate the presence of multistability phenomena.
The results we come up with can be read under different perspectives. Our most relevant
finding concerns the static analysis of the set of possible steady states. We show that, inde-
pendently of the structural features of the sectors under consideration and of their degree of
integration, the steady state final outcomes depend on the optimistic/pessimistic bias and on
the intensity of choice of the evolutionary process. If both b and β are suitably small, a unique
steady state exists, whose position is independent of b and β. Conversely, if either b or β in-
creases, two new biased steady states emerge, whose position depends on such parameters and
which coexist with the previous one. With respect to it, the two new steady states respectively
exhibit larger or smaller values in the level of national income and price. This means that
in some sense, such final outcomes “keep track” of the optimistic/pessimistic biased belief of
the agents, and depart from the unbiased equilibrium. The intuition for the existence of these
biased steady states can be read as follows: when the realizations of the true fundamental value
of the traded asset are close to some biased beliefs, if the intensity of choice is high enough, then
almost all agents will adopt the optimistic or pessimistic predictor, which is the best performing
predictor in terms of forecasting error, leading the dynamics to converge to a biased equilib-
rium. In the same way, when the intensity of choice is sufficiently large, even small differences
in predictors’ performances may lead agents to massively switch among forecasting rules. Such
alternating waves of optimism and pessimism can drive the system to periodic cycles.
From the mathematical viewpoint, the emergence of additional steady states follows a pitchfork
bifurcation, whose consequent multistability is further investigated through global analysis, in
order to have a complete picture of the possible dynamical scenarios. The independence of the
emergence (but not of the position) of the biased steady states from ω makes possible that
the same economic setting can simultaneously take advantage or be hindered from isolated
or fully integrated markets, with a consequent increase in the level of national income and
prices, or, conversely, a reduction in the level of national income like, for instance, during a
financial shock within an integrated system. The latter framework can be read in the wake of
the recent financial crisis where, if on the one hand an integrated economy may facilitate ex-
change and production through the intermediation of financial instruments, on the other hand
no real benefits to the society deriving from the activities of increased financialization may be
appraised.
Carrying on the investigation and moving to a dynamical perspective, the analysis we per-
form allows us to determine the local stability conditions for each steady state, from which
we infer a possible ambiguous role for each relevant parameter. Deepening the investigation
with the help of numerical simulations, we show that periodic, quasi-periodic and complex dy-
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namics can occur, from a global viewpoint, either when a unique or three steady states exist.
Accordingly, oscillations arising in our model are endogenously generated and stoked by the
acceleration principle acting in the real subsystem which, in turn, may be triggered by the
nonlinearity of the real subsystem, as found in [24] too. In addition, we show the possible
coexistence of pairs of complex attractors, arising by the loss of stability of the two new steady
states, which give rise to endogenous fluctuations around either the pessimistic or the optimistic
steady state. We also find that, even when the fundamental steady state is locally stable, other
attractors may coexist with it, making the choice of initial condition crucial for the course of
the resulting economic dynamics. Dealing with a purely deterministic version of the model, the
convergence toward a particular attractor is determined in advance by the choice of the initial
datum. Conversely, when a stochastic version of the model is considered, in which the agents’
demands are buffeted with noise, trajectories can approach different attractors from time to
time, so that, for example, periods of persistent optimistic and pessimistic fluctuations can
interchange, giving rise to alternating booms and busts. In general, the emergence of stylized
facts is mathematically connected with an increasing complexity of the generated dynamics.
On the contrary, we show that this is possible in our model even in the presence of stable steady
states, when the pitchfork bifurcation occurs. That level of investigation turns out to be rele-
vant to reproduce realistic dynamics observed in the real financial markets together with several
stylized facts regarding the return of stock prices (and output as well), such as positive autocor-
relation, volatility clustering and non-normal distribution characterized by a high kurtosis and
fat tails, with dynamics resulting from the combination of nonlinear forces and random shocks.
Therefore, the analytical and numerical results we retrieve from the deterministic framework
flow into a better understanding of the stochastic framework.
To summarize, a growing polarization of beliefs gives rise to an increasing richness in the
economic regimes that may originate due to the evolutive framework. In such regimes the
optimistic and pessimistic hallmark of the belief is not lost but it is mixed up by the complexity
of the scenarios, and marks the emerging regimes which are characterized by low, medium or
high levels of economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model economy
highlighting the features of the two markets; in Section 3 we present the analytical results on the
steady states and their local stability; in Section 4 the simulations regarding the deterministic
framework as well as the stochastic version of the model are performed and analyzed; in Section
5 we draw some conclusions on our findings; the Appendix gathers all the proofs.
2 The model economy
In the present section we shall introduce the baseline model made up of two interacting sectors,
i.e., the real market and the stock market, which are separately outlined in the following
subsections. Since the real market we consider essentially consists in the same closed economy
taken into account in [4], while the stock market is very close to that depicted in [23], we
limit ourselves to report the constitutive and distinctive elements of each market, addressing
the interested reader to the above-mentioned works for a more detailed description. In what
follows, we are making use of sigmoid functions, namely functions g : R → R that satisfy the
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following assumptions:
• vanish at z = 0 and are strictly increasing; (1a)
• are convex on (−∞, 0], concave on [0,+∞) and attain maximum slope 1 at z = 0; (1b)
• are bounded above and below. (1c)
2.1 The real market
As usual, at each time t, the national income Yt can be expressed through the macroeconomic
equilibrium condition
Yt = Ct +Gt + It, (2)
in which we assume constant exogenous government expenditures Gt ≡ G¯ and aggregate con-
sumption Ct depending on autonomous consumption C¯ and on the last period national income,
setting Ct = C¯+cYt−1, where c ∈ (0, 1) represents the marginal propensity to consume. Private
investments are expressed through
It = I¯ + γgI(Yt−1 − Yt−2) + ωhPt−1, (3)
where I¯ are exogenous investments, while the last two terms respectively encompass the ac-
celerator principle and the dependence of the real market on the stock sector, with ω ∈ [0, 1]
representing the degree of interaction between the two markets, h > 0 the marginal propensity
to invest from the stock market wealth and Pt−1 the price of the financial asset. As noted in
[28], a better performance of the financial side of the economy, here encompassed in P, has a
beneficial effect on the patrimonial situation of the private sector, promoting greater invest-
ments.
Concerning the second term, γ > 0 is the accelerator parameter and gI : R → R is a func-
tion that satisfies assumptions (1). Thanks to assumption (1a), if the national income raises
or decline, after a gestation lag, the component of investments depending on national income
variation ∆Yt−1 increases or decreases accordingly, by a bounded quantity, thanks to assump-
tion (1c). Finally, thanks to assumption (1b), the effect of both positive and negative national
income variations are less and less significant as |∆Yt−1| → +∞, attaining its maximum at
∆Yt−1 = 0, where the slope coincides with accelerator γ. We stress that all the previous aspects
are in line with the classic macroeconomic literature of the 1930s-1950s (see e.g. [12, 15, 16]).
Taking into account the expressions for the government expenditure, aggregate consumption
and private investments, from (2) we obtain
Yt = A + cYt−1 + γgI(Yt−1 − Yt−2) + ωhPt−1,
where we defined A ≡ C¯ + I¯ + G¯ as the sum of the autonomous components. We stress that if
ω = 0 the stock market has no influence on the national income, while if ω = 1 the two markets
are fully integrated.
2.2 The stock market
We assume that the stock market is populated by fundamentalists, who buy (sell) the asset if its
price is lower (higher) than the value estimated as the fundamental asset price but, due to some
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form of bounded rationality, do not know the true fundamental value of the asset price, trying
to form forecasts about it. On the basis of these beliefs, they operate in the stock market.
In particular, we suppose there are two groups of fundamentalists: optimists, who typically
overestimate the true fundamental asset price, and pessimists, who underestimate it. This
approach has been adopted before in [8] and [14], assuming that optimists (resp. pessimists)
expect a constant price above (resp. below) the fundamental price. The asset price is set by a
market maker on the basis of the following nonlinear adjustment mechanism
Pt = Pt−1 + σgP
(
αtD
O
t−1 + (1− αt)DPt−1
)
, (4)
where αt represents the fraction of optimistic fundamentalists, D
O
t−1 and D
P
t−1 denote optimistic
and pessimistic demand, respectively, while σ > 0 measures the reactivity of the price variation
to aggregate excess demand and gP : R→ R is a function fulfilling assumptions (1). We stress
that a similar price adjustment mechanism has been deeply investigated in [22], where it was
introduced to prevent an overreaction of price variation to a large excess demand with the
consequent unrealistic uncontrolled growth or negativity of prices. In the present contribution,
an overreaction would also lead the real sector variables to diverge or to become economically
meaningless.
The demand of optimistic and pessimistic agents is proportional to the gap between the
estimated fundamental asset price and the realized price, i.e., DOt = µ
(
FOt − Pt
)
, DPt =
µ
(
F Pt − Pt
)
, where µ > 0 represents the agents’ reactivity to such gap. In an environment
in which agents, due to their bounded rationality, roughly know the fundamental stock price,
they can disagree about the correct value of the fundamental price and can make different
estimates on it. In particular, we assume that FOt = F
∗
t + b and F
P
t = F
∗
t − b, where b is a
positive parameter representing the bias on the fundamental price. On raising b, agents become
more and more distant in their beliefs, which are increasingly polarized toward high level of
optimism/pessimism. Hence, parameter b also portrays the degree of agents’ heterogeneity1.
As concerns the true, unobserved, fundamental value F ∗t , it is described by a weighted average
between an exogenous fundamental value F ∗ and an endogenous component proportional to the
national income Yt, resulting in F
∗
t = (1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt, where d > 0 captures the strength of
the linear dependence between the fundamental value and the current national income level. In
this way, F ∗t is linked to the course of the real economy through ω ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the interaction
degree intensity parameter which has been introduced for the investments’ function in (3). It
is worth noticing that if ω = 0 the true unobserved fundamental value is completely exogenous,
while if ω = 1 it is endogenously determined by national income, as in [28].
Therefore, the demand functions for both optimists and pessimists become
DOt = µ ((1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt + b− Pt)
DPt = µ ((1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt − b− Pt) ,
and, replacing them into the price equation (4), we obtain the following expression for the price
dynamics
Pt = Pt−1 + σgP
(
µ ((1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt−1 − Pt−1 + b (2αt − 1))
)
.
1As it will become evident along the paper, b is one of the most relevant parameters from both the interpreta-
tive and the mathematical point of view. To keep the investigation analytically tractable and the interpretation
more straightforward, we decided to limit ourselves to consider the symmetric situation in which FOt and F
P
t
lie at the same distance b from F ∗t .
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In order to discipline the evolution of the agents’ share employing a certain speculative
rule, we assume that a fraction of optimistic agents can switch from period to period to the
other behavior, and vice versa. In the present model, differently from [23] and similarly to [5],
such an evolutionary process is governed by the squared forecasting error evaluated on the last
realization of the fundamental value and of the stock price, namely
SEit =
(
F it−1 − Pt−1
)2
, i ∈ {O,P}.
Following [2], we assume the fractions evolve according to a multinomial logit rule, that is
αt =
e−β(F
O
t−1−Pt−1)
2
e−β(F
O
t−1−Pt−1)
2
+ e−β(F
P
t−1−Pt−1)
2 ,
where the positive parameter β, also called intensity of choice, measures how fast the mass
of optimistic fundamentalists will switch to the optimal prediction strategy. In the limit case
β = 0, fractions will be constant and equal to 0.5, and traders never switch strategy; in the other
extreme case β → +∞, in each period all traders use the same, optimal strategy. The latter
case represents the highest possible degree of rationality with respect to strategy selection based
upon past performance in a heterogeneous agents environment (see [14] for further discussion
on the topic). Moreover, β also encompasses the agents’ perception of the beliefs relevance.
Independently of the moderate or strong polarization of the beliefs (small or large value of b),
if the agents give a small relevance to them (β is small), they will more likely stick to their
current forecasting behavior, while if they give a serious consideration to them (β is large),
their tendency to trust and switch to the best performing belief will result strengthened.
In so doing, the equation that describes the dynamics of the asset price reads as
Pt = Pt−1 + σgP
(
µ
(
(1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt−1 − Pt−1 + b
(
2
1 + e−4bβ(Pt−1−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdYt−1)
− 1
)))
.
Summarizing, defining Zt ≡ Yt−1 in view of the subsequent analysis and taking into account
both the real and financial sectors, we can introduce the function G = (G1, G2, G3) : R
3
+ →
R
3, (Yt, Pt, Zt) 7→ (G1(Yt, Pt, Zt), G2(Yt, Pt, Zt), G3(Yt, Pt, Zt)), which describes the functioning
of the whole economy:


Yt+1 = G1(Yt, Pt, Zt) = A+ cYt + γgI(Yt − Zt) + ωhPt,
Pt+1 = G2(Yt, Pt, Zt) = Pt + σgP
(
µ ((1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt − Pt + b (2αt+1 − 1))
)
,
Zt+1 = G3(Yt, Pt, Zt) = Yt,
(5a)
(5b)
(5c)
where
αt+1 =
1
1 + e−4bβ(Pt−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdYt)
.
3 Analytical results on steady states and their stability
In this section we investigate the existence of equilibria for the model in (5), studying the effect
on the position and on the stability of the steady states played by the relevant parameters,
8
paying specific attention to the role of the intensity of choice β, of the bias b and of the
interaction parameter ω. We start by investigating the number and the expression of possible
steady states of the map in (5).
Proposition 1. System (5) has
a) a unique steady state S∗ = (Y ∗, P ∗, Z∗) =
(
A+ω(1−ω)hF ∗
1−c−ω2dh ,
(1−ω)(1−c)F ∗+ωdA
1−c−ω2dh ,
A+ω(1−ω)hF ∗
1−c−ω2dh
)
if
b ≤ 1√
2β
. (6)
Such steady state is well defined for any interaction degree value ω ∈ [0, 1] provided that
1− c− hd > 0. (7)
b) three steady states S∗ = (Y ∗, P ∗, Z∗), SL = (Y L, PL, ZL) and SH = (Y H , PH, ZH) if
b > 1√
2β
. In particular, SL and SH are symmetric w.r.t. S∗, which is still well defined
for any ω provided that (7) is fulfilled. Moreover, it holds that IL < I∗ < IH , for
I ∈ {Y, P, Z}, and
Pℓ = P
∗ − 1− c
1− c− ω2dhb < P
L < P ∗ < PH < P ∗ +
1− c
1− c− ω2dhb = Ph.
Yℓ = Y
∗ − hω
1− c− ω2dhb < Y
L < Y ∗ < Y H < Y ∗ +
hω
1− c− ω2dhb = Yh.
(8)
All the components of such new steady states are strictly positive if
b < min
{
dA
1− c, F
∗
}
. (9)
From Proposition 1, it is possible to have either one or three steady states, whose existence
is triggered by sufficiently large values of β and b. Steady state S∗, in which Y ∗ reduces to the
same steady state of the Samuelson model when ω = 0, is in agreement with those found in
[4, 21, 23], so that all the comments therein apply to S∗, as well.
We stress that the steady state S∗ represents an unbiased final outcome of the economic
system, since it is affected neither by the bias, nor by the evolutionary pressure. Conversely,
suitably strong beliefs (namely a suitably strong joint effect of belief polarization and relevance
given to them by the agents) trigger the emergence of the two supplementary biased steady
states SL and SH . Moreover, recalling (8), S∗ consists in intermediate steady price and na-
tional income levels, while SL and SH represent polarized steady states, with respectively small
and large steady values. Proposition 1 then shows that sufficiently strong beliefs can drive,
independently of the economic setting and its features, the system toward optimistic (like SH)
or pessimistic (like SL) steady states. This result is absent in the related literature, where
the only possibilities are given either by a unique steady state ([4, 23]) or by always existing
multiple steady states ([28]), which are then independent of the underlying characteristics of
the economy and of the agents. In agreement with a Keynesian line of thought, Proposition
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1 clearly shows how beliefs, influencing the stock market performance that, in an integrated
framework, has in turn a direct influence on the investments, can be the essential cause and
driving force that introduces and leads to final outcomes consisting of persistent flourishing or
depressed income levels. The optimistic/pessimistic polarization of beliefs, under the evolution-
ary perspective, reflects on the “sentiment” of the steady states, and can drive the dynamics
of the economy toward a more optimistic or pessimistic final output. We stress that also in
such situations, the intermediate outcome S∗ is still relevant, as it will become evident from
the dynamical analysis, while in [28] it attracts just a set with null measure.
We recall that b encompasses the boundedly rational nature of the agents, while the presence
of the switching mechanism, that is crucial as well, is regulated by the parameter β, that is
positively connected to the rationality of the agents in the selection of the forecasting rule, as
the larger is the intensity of choice, the larger is the fraction of agents that “rationally” turns
to the speculative rule that proved to be the most effective in forecasting the actual stock price.
In this sense, we can say that the emergence of the pessimistic and optimistic steady states is
fostered by the joint action of an irrational component (b) and of a rational component (β) in
agents’ behavior. The roles of b and β, which we already noted to be very interconnected from
the interpretative point of view, can not be completely disentangled also from the mathematical
viewpoint, and we will see that both parameters have a similar influence on the results.
From (8), the optimistic or pessimistic divergence of the biased steady states from the
unbiased one is potentially more relevant as the polarization of the beliefs increases. Our next
level of investigation is then devoted to study the effect of the main parameters on the steady
states position. Since Z i = Y i, i ∈ {∗, H, L} and Z has not its own relevance from the economic
point of view, we do not deal with it, recalling, however, that it behaves exactly as Y.
In order to have the steady state S∗ well defined for any interaction degree value ω ∈ [0, 1],
in the remainder of the paper we shall assume that (7) is fulfilled, even when not explicitly
mentioned, as well as we also assume (9) when dealing with SH and SL, to guarantee the
economic meaningfulness of each steady state value.
In the following comparative static result, we investigate the effects of b and β on the steady
state values Y i and P i, i ∈ {∗, H, L}.
Proposition 2. Under assumption (7), S∗ remains unchanged on increasing β or b.
Let b < min{dA/(1−c), F ∗}. Then, on increasing β ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞), we have that PH and Y H
are strictly increasing, while PL and Y L are strictly decreasing. Moreover, limβ→+∞ P
L(β) = Pℓ
and limβ→+∞ P
H(β) = Ph, limβ→+∞ Y
L(β) = Yℓ and limβ→+∞ Y
H(β) = Yh, with Pℓ, Yℓ and
Ph, Yh representing respectively the lower and upper bounds defined in (8).
On increasing b ∈ (1/√2β,min{dA/(1− c), F ∗}), we have that PH and Y H are strictly increas-
ing, while PL and Y L are strictly decreasing.
The comparative static results of Proposition 2 deepen the understating of the effect of
the beliefs on the steady states. In Figure 1 we report the evolution of Y L, Y ∗ and Y H on
increasing β and b, setting c = d = h = 0.5, A = F = 10, ω = 1, and b = 0.5 (Figure 1 (A)),
β = 1 (Figure 1 (B)). The values of Y L and Y H are obtained numerically solving an implicit
equation similar to (17), but in terms of Y, using (16). Indeed, S∗ is neither affected by the
intensity of choice nor by the bias. Conversely, not only the existence of SL and SH is affected
by β and b, but also their values, and in particular their departure from the intermediate steady
10
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Figure 1: Steady state national incomes Y L (blue), Y ∗ (black) and Y H (red) on varying β (plot
(A)) and b (plot (B)).
state S∗. This means that the stronger are the beliefs (in terms of polarization or intensity of
choice), the stronger get the optimistic/pessimistic connotation of the possible final outcomes.
In agreement with (8), the maximum possible deviation of SL and SH from S∗ is proportional
to the belief polarization and the bounds for P and Y can actually be approached as β → +∞,
that is agents immediately switch to the best performing behavior as if “perfectly rational”.
The next proposition studies the effects of ω on the steady states.
Proposition 3. Under assumption (7), on increasing ω ∈ [0, 1], P ∗ can be either increasing,
decreasing or there exists ωP ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that P ∗ decreases on [0, ωP ∗) and increases on
(ωP ∗ , 1]. On increasing ω ∈ [0, 1], Y ∗ can be either increasing or there exists ωY ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that Y ∗ increases on [0, ωY ∗) and decreases on (ωY ∗ , 1].
Let 1/
√
2β < b < min{dA/(1− c), F ∗} and assume that
PL(ω) 6= P ∗ − 1− c
1− c− ω2dh
√
b2 − 1
2β
, ∀ω ∈ (0, 1). (10)
Then, on increasing ω ∈ (0, 1), we have that, for j ∈ {L,H}, P j can be either increasing,
decreasing or there exists ωP j ∈ (0, 1) such that P j decreases on (0, ωP j) and increases on
(ωP j , 1). On increasing ω ∈ (0, 1), for j ∈ {L,H}, Y j can be either increasing or there exists
ωY j ∈ (0, 1) such that Y j increases on (0, ωY j) and decreases on (ωY j , 1).
The previous proposition shows that the effect produced by the degree of interaction between
real and stock markets on the steady state values can be quite ambiguous. Since the value of
Y ∗ is the same as that resulting in [4] in the case of exogenous government expenditure, the
unbiased steady national income is either increasing or concave unimodal, reaching a greater
value in the case of completely integrated markets than in that of isolated ones (see [4]).
Additionally, both optimistic and pessimistic steady national income can be either increasing
or concave unimodal as well.
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Figure 2: Steady states PL (blue), P ∗ (black) and PH (red) on varying ω.
Concerning prices, in Figure 2 we report the evolution with respect to ω of the steady
state values PL, P ∗ and PH setting A = 10, c = d = h = 0.5 and b = β = 1, for different
values of F ∗. We remark that PL and PH are computed numerically solving equation (17)
through which they are implicitly defined. On increasing ω we may have situations in which
the more the markets are integrated, the more price increases (Figure 2 (A)), as well as opposite
situations in which, increasing the market integration, price is penalized (Figure 2 (C)), with
intermediate scenarios in which a partial integration provides the lowest price (Figure 2 (B)).
In this last case, we stress a further element of ambiguity: if we compare the steady state values
obtained for the same pair of stock and real markets when independent (ω = 0) and completely
integrated (ω = 1), it is not possible to conclude which one has the largest prices. From Figure
2 (B), it is evident that we can simultaneously have all the possible orderings between prices,
as PL(0) > PL(1), P ∗(0) ≈ P ∗(1) and PH(0) < PH(1).
In the rest of the section, we focus on the local stability of the steady states. The first group
of results (see Propositions 4–6) deals with S∗. We start providing analytical conditions under
which S∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
Proposition 4. Under assumption (7), System (5) is locally asymptotically stable at S∗ pro-
vided that 

2b2β − 1 < 0
(2− E) (1 + c+ 2γ)− ω2dhE > 0
1− c+ cE + ω2dhE + γc−Eγ −Eγc+ E2γ − E2γ2 + Eγ2 − γ > 0
2γ + c− cE − γE − ω2dhE < 3
(11a)
(11b)
(11c)
(11d)
where E = µσ(1− 2b2β).
Before making explicit from (11) the roles of the interaction degree, of the intensity of choice
and of the bias on the stability of S∗, we note that condition (11a) actually coincides with (6),
whose violation leads to the emergence of two more steady states. As it will become evident also
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from the simulations, when S∗ loses stability because of (11a), a pitchfork bifurcation occurs
and two stable steady states SL and SH emerge.
We now turn our attention to the roles of β and b. We highlight that a neutral effect on
a steady state is realized when it is locally asymptotically stable/unstable independently of
the parameter values; a stabilizing/destabilizing effect occurs when the steady state is locally
asymptotically stable only above/below a given threshold value of the considered parameter
and unstable otherwise; a mixed effect arises when the steady state is locally asymptotically
stable only for intermediate parameter values, between two stability thresholds, and unstable
otherwise.
Proposition 5. Under assumption (7), increasing b or β can have a mixed, destabilizing or
neutral effect on S∗.
The previous result points out that the bias and the intensity of choice have the same
qualitative effect on the stability of S∗. If the polarization and the relevance of the beliefs is
sufficiently increased, S∗ necessarily loses stability. Indeed, from the proof of Proposition 5 we
find that S∗ can be unstable for any values of b and β, but it cannot be always locally asymp-
totically stable. The unbiased steady state is then weakened when increasing heterogeneity of
the beliefs as it becomes surrounded by the new potentially attracting polarized steady states
and because it becomes unstable, although from a static viewpoint its position is not affected
by b and β. However, as we will see in Section 5, the role of the unbiased steady state, when
unstable, may still be significant.
In the following result, we describe the possible stability scenarios arising for S∗ when ω
varies.
Proposition 6. Under assumption (7), increasing ω on [0, 1] can have a neutral, destabilizing,
stabilizing or mixed effect on S∗.
The results obtained in Proposition 6 on the role of ω are in agreement with those reported
in [23], namely the possible scenarios are the same, proving once more the ambiguous role of
the interaction degree. It is then not possible to conclude that either encouraging or dampening
the integration between the two sides of the economy improves the stability of the markets.
To summarize the findings about the stability of S∗, in Figure 3 we report three different
stability regions in the (β, ω)-plane, obtained setting c = d = h = 0.38, b = 0.5 and µ = 1,
and changing σ and γ from time to time in order to highlight different stability configurations.
Parameters’ combinations for which S∗ is locally asymptotically stable are represented using
yellow color, while cyan color is used for the instability region. The stability thresholds cor-
responding to conditions (11a), (11b) and (11c) are represented by solid, dashed and dotted
black lines, respectively. In particular, the region reported in Figure 3 (A) is obtained setting
σ = 3, γ = 0.8, and shows the occurrence, on varying ω, of unconditionally unstable, destabiliz-
ing and unconditionally stable scenarios for β = 0.1, β = 0.69 and β = 1.5, respectively (vertical
dashed red lines). On varying β, we always find a mixed scenario (e.g. horizontal dashed red
line ω = 0.95). The stabilizing scenario (vertical dashed red line β = 0.4) on increasing ω is
reported in Figure 3 (B), which is obtained setting σ = 1.3 and γ = 1.05. On varying β we have
unconditionally unstable (e.g. when ω = 0.55), mixed (e.g. when ω = 0.58) and destabilizing
(e.g. when ω = 0.75) scenarios. Finally, setting σ = 4 and γ = 1.05 we obtain the stability
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Figure 3: Stability regions in the (β, ω)-plane. Yellow and cyan colors respectively identify
parameters’ combinations for which S∗ is locally asymptotically stable and unstable. Solid,
dashed and dotted black lines represent stability thresholds, while dashed red lines identify
unconditionally unstable (UU), unconditionally stable (US), mixed (M), destabilizing (D) and
stabilizing (S) scenarios.
region reported in Figure 3 (C), in which we underline the occurrence of mixed scenarios both
on varying ω (e.g. for β = 1.03) and β (e.g. for ω = 0.8). The previous considerations allow
concluding that each scenario predicted by Propositions 5 and 6 is actually possible. We stress
that the mixed scenarios on varying β pointed out in each of Figures 3 (A)–(C) are obtained
crossing different couplings of thresholds.
In the next proposition we show the possible effects of ω and β on the local asymptotic
stability of SH and SL, provided that they exist and are positive.
Proposition 7. Let assumptions (7) and (9) hold true. If, keeping ω fixed and increasing β,
for S∗ we have
• a destabilizing scenario, then on increasing β ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞) we can either have a stabilizing
or an unconditionally stable scenario on SH and SL;
• a mixed scenario, then on increasing β ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞) we can either have a destabilizing or
a mixed scenario on SH and SL;
• an unconditionally unstable scenario, then SH and SL are unconditionally unstable, too.
Moreover, on increasing ω, there is a one to one correspondence between the scenarios for S∗
for β < 1/(2b2) and those for SH and SL for β > 1/(2b2).
The previous proposition shows that the stability of SL and SH is strongly connected to
that of S∗. From the mathematical point of view, we actually have that the stability behavior
of SL and SH is a “specular reflection” of that of S∗ with respect to β = 1/(2b2). Decreasing
β has the same effect on the stability of S∗ of increasing it on the stability of SL and SH .
Thanks to Proposition 7, we can highlight a substantial difference with the scenarios of the
economic setting reported in [23]: in the present case, for increasing values of the intensity of
choice, when S∗ loses stability (both in the destabilizing and in the mixed scenarios) we can
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still have convergence toward a steady state. Such framework occurs when S∗ undergoes a
pitchfork bifurcation and the new steady states SL and SH are locally stable. This means that,
in such scenario, the final outcome is always a steady state, which, even if it changes, may be
locally stable. The most extreme situation is realized when a destabilizing scenario for S∗ is
followed by an unconditionally stable one for SL and SH . Accordingly, convergence toward a
steady state may occur for any value of β.
4 Numerical simulations
In this section we present the results of several numerical investigations, collected pursuing a
double aim. Firstly, we wish to complement the analysis of Section 3. In particular, we want to
understand what kinds of dynamics occur when S∗ becomes unstable, as well as to investigate
the possible scenarios arising with the emergence of SL and SH . Secondly, we want to study
the qualitative properties of the time series when exogenous non-deterministic effects are taken
into account, that is, considering a stochastically perturbed version of the model, in agreement
with [4, 11, 23]. In continuity with Section 3, we focus on the effect of the degree of interaction
ω and of the intensity of choice β.
In order to perform simulations, we need to specify the analytical expressions of gI and gP .
In what follows, we use the same sigmoid function considered in [3], i.e.,
gX(z) =


aX1 tanh
(
z
aX1
)
if z ≥ 0,
aX2 tanh
(
z
aX2
)
if z < 0,
(12)
where X ∈ {I, P} and aX1 , aX2 are positive parameters, with aX1 as upper bound when z → +∞
and −aX2 as lower bound when z → −∞. A straightforward check shows that function gX
belongs to C2(R) and satisfies assumptions (1). In all the simulations reported in the present
section we set F = A = 15, c = d = h = 0.38, b = 0.5 and µ = 1.
Concerning the upper and lower bounds aXi , i ∈ {1, 2}, of functions gI and gP , we start by
recalling that the steady state values of P and Y significantly change on varying ω. Since
such bounds represent the maximum possible positive or negative variation of Pt and Yt, it
is reasonable to assume that they are qualitatively connected to the magnitude of prices and
national incomes. In fact, it makes economic sense to think that investments and prices can
not grow indefinitely but that, instead, their variation is linked to the pace of economic ac-
tivity, reflected in the level of prices and national income, which are in turn connected to the
amount of resources existing in a certain country. To encompass such fact into the simula-
tions, we let aXi proportionally change depending on the value of the steady state S
∗, setting
aP1 = 2P
∗/F, aP2 = 4P
∗/F, aI1 = 3Y
∗(1 − c)/A and aI2 = 6Y ∗(1 − c)/A. In this way, for ω = 0
we have aP1 = 2, a
P
2 = 4, a
I
1 = 3, a
I
2 = 6, while they increase/decrease, on varying ω, pro-
portionally to P ∗ and Y ∗ (see Proposition 3). We recall that we checked the robustness of
the simulations by varying all the parameters in suitable ranges, obtaining results that are
qualitatively comparable with those reported in the next subsections. We also point out that
the reported two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams are obtained setting the same initial datum
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Figure 4: Simulations obtained setting σ = 3 and γ = 0.8. (A): Two-parameters bifurcation diagram.
White color identifies parameters’ combinations for which the initial datum converges toward a steady
state, other colors are used for attractors consisting of more than a single point (cyan is used for
attractors consisting of more than 32 points). Black lines denote the stability thresholds of S∗, while
the green line denotes the stability threshold of SH . (B): Bifurcation diagrams for P on varying β
when ω = 1. Different colors correspond to different initial conditions.
for each parameters’ coupling. Conversely, in order to highlight coexistence, one-dimensional
bifurcation diagrams are all obtained “following the attractor”. This means that, having a
strictly increasing or decreasing sequence of parameters ai, i = 1, . . . , m, we set the initial
datum for the first simulation equal to a1, while the initial datum for the simulation with ai+1
is set suitably close to the solution of the simulation obtained with ai.
4.1 Deterministic simulations
We shall now explain the functioning of the model by considering different sets of simulations,
which provide a portrait of the possible dynamics that may occur in our model economy, empha-
sizing how the relevant parameters affect the evolution of the economic variables. In particular,
we aim to account for the richness of the possibly complex dynamical behaviors arising in un-
stable regimes, which however keep evident track of the simple distinctive characterization of
the beliefs, in terms of optimistic/pessimistic bias.
In the first set of simulations we set σ = 3 and γ = 0.8, and the resulting stability region for
S∗ is that reported in Figure 3 (A). In Figure 4 (A) we show the two-dimensional bifurcation
diagram in the (β, ω)-plane, where each point is represented using a different color depending
on the number of points of the attractor that was approached starting by the initial datum
(Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗+0.001, P ∗+0.001, Z∗+0.001) after T = 10000 iterations. In particular, white
color denotes parameter combinations for which convergence is toward a one-point attractor,
i.e., a steady state, red color is used for period-2 cycles, cyan color for attractors consisting of
more than 32 points (namely, high period cycles, chaotic attractors or closed invariant curves),
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Figure 5: Evolution of the basins of attraction on varying the intensity of choice β. In (A)-(B) the
basins of attraction of the steady state S∗ is represented in yellow together with the basin of the
coexisting 2-cycle, in violet. Panel (C) refers to the basins of the biased steady states SL and SH
whose birth is due to the occurrence of the pitchfork bifurcation which makes the unbiased steady
state S∗ unstable. In panel (D) the basins of the two 2-cycles arising at the destabilization of SL and
SH are depicted, which then turn into chaotic attractors due to a cascade of further period-doubling
bifurcations for increasing values of β, as panels (E)-(F) show.
and the remaining colors for cycles with periods between 3 and 32. Black solid and dashed lines
respectively represent the stability thresholds corresponding to (11a) and (11b), delimiting the
region within which (see also the yellow set in Figure 3 (A)) the steady state S∗ is stable and
dynamics converge toward it (white region L1). If we start from any (β, ω) ∈ L1 and we increase
β, we exit the stability region L1 as S∗ crosses the black solid line, but in the white region R1
dynamics again converge toward a steady state. In fact, according to Propositions 1 and 4,
such black line, whose equation is given by β = 2 since b = 0.5, represents both the bound
for the stability condition (11a) for S∗ and the threshold to the left/right of which we have a
unique/three coexisting steady states. As a consequence, when the solid line β = 2 is crossed
on increasing β, the steady state S∗ becomes unstable by means of a pitchfork bifurcation and
the two stable steady states SL and SH arise. We stress that, with the present choice of the
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initial datum, dynamics converge toward SH for all (β, ω) ∈ R1.
Region R1 is the specular of L1 with respect to β = 2. In particular, the green dashed line
is obtained starting from the black dashed threshold line and numerically solving the implicit
equations used in the proof of Proposition 7. This, in agreement with Proposition 7, confirms
that region R1 is the region of local asymptotic stability for SH .
As remarked in the comments to Figure 3 (A), on increasing β we have mixed scenarios
for S∗ for any ω. From Proposition 7, since the right stability threshold for S∗ is described
by the “pitchfork” condition (11a), this is the only situation in which a mixed scenario for S∗
“translates” into a destabilizing scenario for SH . As described after Proposition 7, this is simply
due to the fact that, crossing β = 2 from right to left, SH disappears. In fact, starting from any
(β, ω) ∈ R1, for increasing values of β we cross the green stability threshold, while decreasing β
we leave R1 entering L1. To be more precise about the possible dynamics occurring when steady
states lose stability, we can see that when we leave both L1 and R1 crossing a dashed stability
threshold, we enter one of the red regions, meaning that dynamics, previously converging to a
steady state, now converge to a period-2 cycle.
In Figure 4 (B) we report three bifurcation diagrams obtained for ω = 12. The blue bifurcation
diagram is obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗+0.001, P ∗+0.001, Z∗+0.001) and on varying β
between 0 and 1.17, while the red and the black bifurcation diagrams are obtained respectively
setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ + 0.001, P ∗+ 0.001, Z∗+ 0.001) and (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ − 0.001, P ∗−
0.001, Z∗ − 0.001), and on varying β between 0.73 and 5.
We can see that as long as β < 0.728 (black dashed line), but close to such value, dynamics
converge toward a period-2 cycle which attracts almost all the trajectories3. Such period-2
cycle coexists with the stable steady state S∗ on an interval of values of β, and then the former
disappears when its basin of attraction shrinks and is absorbed by that of the steady state.
This coexistence is also reported in Figures 5 (A)-(B) where the basin of attraction4 of S∗ is
represented in yellow while the basin of the 2-cycle is depicted in violet. The two panels show
that, as β grows, the basin of the 2-cycle reduces in size and for further increases of the intensity
of choice parameter there is a contact between the periodic points and their basin boundary
leading to the disappearance of the 2-cycle.
From the red and the black bifurcation diagrams of Figure 4 (B), it is evident the pitchfork
bifurcation occurring at β = 2 with the red and the black lines springing from S∗ that respec-
tively represent SH and SL (see Figure 5 (C), which reports the basins of attraction of the
steady states born via the pitchfork bifurcation). These are the biased steady states, whose
birth via pitchfork bifurcation can be read as the effect of agents’ decision when the intensity
of choice is high enough. In this case almost all agents adopt the optimistic or pessimistic pre-
2We checked that for ω < 1 we obtain bifurcation diagrams that are qualitatively the same of that reported
in Figure 4 (B).
3More precisely, when (β, ω) belongs to the dashed lines in Figure 4 (A) a flip bifurcation occurs. In fact,
for the present parameters’ configuration, on such dashed line, condition (11b) becomes an equality, while the
remaining stability conditions in Proposition 4 are satisfied. Condition (11b) is violated when p(−1) = 0, being
p the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix J∗ evaluated at S∗. Since the largest eigenvalue modulus
of J∗ is equal to −1, a flip bifurcation occurs.
4We remark that Figure 5 reports the slice on plane Y = Z of the three-dimensional basins of attraction
for some increasing values of β, together with the projection on such plane of the attractors toward which the
initial data converged.
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dictor, which is the best performing predictor in terms of forecast error, leading the dynamics
to converge to an equilibrium different from S∗. We stress that, according to Proposition 2,
all components of SH and SL are respectively increasing and decreasing with respect to β. If
β is further increased, they both lose stability through a flip bifurcation and then a cascade
of period-doubling bifurcations leads to chaos. In fact, from Figure 4 (D) on we observe the
basins of attraction of the couple of 2-cycles born when SL and SH lose stability. It is also
worth remarking that Proposition 7 guarantees that the first period-doubling bifurcation oc-
curs for the same β value both for SL and SH , and Figure 4 (B) suggests that the subsequent
period-doubling bifurcations are simultaneous, too. Still increasing β has the effect of making
these 2-cycles unstable, leading to the emergence of chaotic attractors (see Figures 4 (E)-(F))
associated with erratic dynamics in the course of price and national income. In this scenario, on
increasing β, the intermediate unbiased steady state loses its relevance when becomes unstable,
as almost all trajectories converge toward the optimistic or the pessimistic attractor.
We now focus on the role of the degree of interaction ω, considering vertical sections of the
bifurcation diagram in Figure 4 (A). The destabilizing scenario for both S∗ and SH only leads
to the emergence of a period-2 cycle (e.g. for β = 0.7). It is worth noticing that the possible
effects on SH of increasing the interaction degree when β > 2 are again specular with respect to
those on S∗ when β < 2. In fact, we can identify neutrally stable (e.g. for β = 2.5) or unstable
(e.g. for β = 4) scenarios, as well as destabilizing scenarios (e.g. for β = 3.2).
The second family of simulations we consider is obtained setting σ = 1.3 and γ = 1.05.
The corresponding stability region for S∗ is depicted in Figure 3 (B) and the corresponding
two-dimensional bifurcation diagram is reported in Figure 6 (A), in which the dotted black line
represents the stability threshold (11c). Differently from the first set of simulations, condition
β = 2 (represented using blue color) acts no more as a stability threshold, but it still shapes
regions in which we have either one or three steady states. The initial datum is always set
equal to (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ + 0.001, P ∗ + 0.001, Z∗ + 0.001) and in region R2 the convergence
is toward SH , while in region L2 convergence is toward S∗.
In this case, we can have either convergence toward a steady state (in regions denoted by L2
and R2) or toward an attractor consisting of more than 32 points (cyan regions). Both couple of
regions are specular with respect to the vertical blue line β = 2, in agreement with Proposition
7, and, depending on the value of the interaction degree, unconditionally unstable, mixed and
destabilizing scenarios for S∗ respectively correspond to unconditionally unstable, mixed and
stabilizing scenarios for SH . This means that the emergence of new steady states makes possible
to have convergence toward a stable steady state as β → +∞.
If we start from (β, ω) ∈ L2 and we increase (or, depending on ω, also if we decrease) β,
the crossing of the black dotted line makes S∗ unstable and immediately trajectories converge
toward an attractor consisting of more than 32 points (represented by cyan color). The same
happens in relation to SH if we start from (β, ω) ∈ R2 and we decrease (or, depending on ω,
also if we increase) β, crossing the green dotted line (which, like in Figure 4 (A), is obtained
starting from the black dotted threshold and numerically solving the implicit equations used
to prove Proposition 7). This stability loss for S∗ and SH is associated with the occurrence of
Neimark-Sacker bifurcations, as it looks evident evident also from Figure 6 (B), where we report
three bifurcation diagrams on varying β for ω = 0.575, which highlight the presence of a mixed
scenario for both S∗ and SH . We stress that we checked that qualitatively similar results are
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Figure 6: Simulations obtained setting σ = 1.3 and γ = 1.05. (A): Two-parameters bifurcation dia-
gram. White color is used to identify parameters’ combinations for which the initial datum converges
toward a steady state, cyan is used for attractors consisting of more than 32 points. The black dotted
line represents the stability threshold of S∗ while the green dotted line refers to the stability threshold
of SH . (B): Bifurcation diagrams for P on varying β when ω = 0.575. Different colors correspond to
different initial conditions.
obtained for all the values of ω for which a mixed scenario arises. The blue bifurcation diagram,
obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ + 0.001, P ∗ + 0.001, Z∗ + 0.001) and increasing β from 0 to
6, lies below the red one, obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ + 0.001, P ∗ + 0.001, Z∗ + 0.001)
and decreasing β from 6 to 0, which in turns lies above the black one, obtained setting
(Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ − 0.001, P ∗ − 0.001, Z∗ − 0.001) and decreasing again β from 6 to 0.
We numerically checked that the closed invariant curve, arising from the stability loss of S∗,
attracts almost any trajectory also for intensity of choice values β > 2 suitably close to 2,
when steady states SH and SL already exist but are unstable (black bifurcation diagram, just
to the right of the blue dotted line). Such closed invariant curve coexists, as β increases, first
with another couple of closed invariant curves (blue, red and black bifurcation diagrams just
to the left of the first green dotted line), then with SH and SL (blue, red and black bifurcation
diagrams between the two green dotted lines) and finally again with another couple of closed
invariant curves (blue, red and black bifurcation diagrams just to the right of the second green
dotted line).
Similar considerations hold also when the destabilizing scenario for S∗ is followed by the sta-
bilizing one for SH and SL. Once more, the common aspect is the coexistence of attractors
encompassing optimistic, pessimistic or unbiased levels in the economic variables, with the ad-
dition of the magenta attractor in which each piece embodies large or small levels too. On
varying ω, from vertical sections of Figure 6 (A) we infer that we can have either stabilizing
scenarios for both S∗ (e.g. for β = 1) and SH (e.g. for β = 3) or unconditionally unstable
scenarios for both S∗ and SH , when β is sufficiently close to 2.
The last family of simulations, whose two-dimensional bifurcation diagram is reported in
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Figure 7: Simulations obtained setting σ = 4 and γ = 1.05. (A): Two-parameters bifurcation diagram.
White color is used to identify parameters’ combinations for which the initial datum converges toward
a steady state, other colors are used for attractors consisting of more than a single point (cyan is used
for attractors consisting of more than 32 points). Black lines represent stability thresholds of S∗, green
lines stability thresholds of SH . (B): Bifurcation diagrams for P on varying β when ω = 0.8. Different
colors correspond to different initial conditions. (C): blow up of plot (B).
Figure 7 (A), is obtained setting σ = 4 and γ = 1.05, and the corresponding stability region is
that reported in Figure 3 (C). The initial datum is the same as in the first two sets of simulations
and, when dynamics converge for β > 2, we have convergence toward SH . All the previous
considerations about the specular stability/instability regions and stability thresholds for S∗ and
SH with respect to β = 2 still hold. On varying β, we can have either unconditionally unstable
or mixed scenarios for both S∗ and SH but, differently from the first two families of simulations,
the convergence toward the steady states may be replaced, when the aforementioned steady
states become unstable, by convergence toward different kinds of attractors for different values
of the interaction degree parameter ω. This is perceivable looking at the stability thresholds for
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S∗ reported in Figure 7 (A). The black dotted curve corresponds to condition (11c), crossing
which we enter the cyan region, in which attractors consist of more then 32 points (actually,
it is a closed invariant curve and the stability loss of S∗ occurs through a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation), while the black dashed line corresponds to condition (11b), crossing which we
enter the red region, in which the attractor is a period-2 cycle. The same holds for the green
stability thresholds for SH , too, which also in this case are obtained from the black thresholds
and numerically solving the implicit equations used in the proof of Proposition 7.
In the four bifurcation diagrams reported in Figures 7 (B)-(C) we study the occurring
dynamics when ω = 0.8. The blue bifurcation diagram is obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) =
(Y ∗ + 0.001, P ∗ + 0.001, Z∗ + 0.001) and increasing β from 1.5 to 2.65; the red one is ob-
tained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ + 0.001, P ∗ + 0.001, Z∗ + 0.001) and decreasing β from 3.3
to 0.855; the black one is obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ − 0.001, P ∗ − 0.001, Z∗ − 0.001)
and decreasing β from 3.3 to 0.855; the magenta one is obtained setting (Y0, P0, Z0) = (Y
∗ +
0.001, P ∗+0.001, Z∗+0.001) and increasing β from 0 to 3.3. As S∗ turns unstable on decreasing
β (when the black dashed line is crossed), the steady state is replaced by a 2-cycle, similarly
to what happens in the first family of simulations. However, as S∗ becomes unstable on in-
creasing β (when there is a crossing of the black dotted line), the steady state is replaced by
a closed-invariant curve. The attractor arising from the stability loss of S∗ then coexists with
the stable steady states SL and SH . Further increasing β, when such two steady states become
unstable (green dashed line), a flip bifurcation occurs5. The subsequent period-2 cycles lose
stability through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
The magenta attractor exists for the whole range of values of β we consider. If we decrease β
from 0.854 to 0, such attractor firstly evolves toward a period-4 cycle and then a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation occurs. If we increase β starting from 0.854, each of the two points composing the
attractor is replaced by a closed invariant curve. As β increases, we have that the attractor
originated by the loss of stability of S∗ (blue bifurcation diagram) coexists with steady states
SL and SH , with a closed invariant curve, and with a period-2 cycle (magenta bifurcation
diagram), giving rise to a quite articulated multistability situation made by qualitatively dif-
ferent attractors. Once more, the common aspect is the coexistence of attractors encompassing
optimistic, pessimistic or unbiased levels in the economic variables, with the addition of the
magenta attractor in which each piece embodies large or small levels, too.
The previous considerations confirm and enrich the analytical results about local stability.
From a qualitative point of view, we can not speak about a unique type of mixed scenario, as
those arising from the simulations above are significantly different. The first relevant difference
can be highlighted in correspondence of the loss of stability of S∗ for increasing values of β,
namely when the rightmost stability threshold is violated. In the example reported in Figure
4, the stable steady state S∗ loses stability through a pitchfork bifurcation, and hence the new
attractor has the same complexity as the previous one, even if it has a different interpretation
from the economic point of view. In the example reported in Figures 6 and 7, dynamics
converging to S∗ are replaced by quasi-periodic dynamics, that is, by an attractor of different
complexity, even if arisen from S∗. The second difference can be highlighted in correspondence
to the loss of stability of S∗ as β decreases, when the leftmost stability threshold is violated.
5Conversely, if β is decreased, we numerically checked that when SL and SH become unstable a closed
invariant curve emerges, which coexists with the blue attractor and quickly disappears.
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In this case, the unique steady state is again S∗, but different dynamics are possible, as the
stability can be lost through a “simple” period-2 cycle or through more complex quasi-periodic
dynamics. We stress that, for the same parameter values describing the stock and the real
economy, different dynamics can arise on changing the degree of interaction. However, even in
the presence of a very articulated range of complex situations, all the dynamic scenarios can be
still traced back to the static setting outlined in Proposition 1, and hence easily read in terms
of the effects of beliefs.
4.2 Stochastic simulations
The deterministic analysis has revealed that, starting from a situation in which the fundamental
steady state is locally stable, an increase in the parameter β generates the onset of endogenous
fluctuations as well as the rise of multistability phenomena. The goal of this part is to show
that a stochastic version of our model is able to generate varied and realistic dynamics, as
observed in real financial markets, such as bubbles and crashes for stock prices and fat tails
and excess volatility in the distributions of returns. In the presence of exogenous noise (on
investors’ demands) and, accordingly, of fundamental shocks to the price dynamics, periods of
high volatility in the price course may alternate with periods in which prices do not depart
too much from the fundamental value. Such behavior may arise when the parameter setting
is located near the pitchfork bifurcation boundary and exogenous noise can occasionally spark
long-lasting endogenous fluctuations around the new steady states.
Therefore the model is modified along the following lines. The demand placed by the two
groups of agents is set as
DXt = µ(F
X
t − Pt) + εXt , X ∈ {O,P}, (13)
where εXt are sequences of independent, identically distributed random normal variables, with
zero mean and variance s2X . These random disturbances may reflect errors in investors’ decision
making processes, heterogeneity within the same group, or they may capture the idea that it
is quite difficult for investors to determine the fundamentals (in fact fundamental values may
change over time due to real shocks), as already argued by [17].
Plugging the perturbed demands into the price equation (4) and acting as in Section 2, we end
up with
Pt = Pt−1+σgP
(
µ
(
(1− ω)F ∗ + ωdYt−1 − Pt−1 + b
(
2
1 + e−4bβ(Pt−1−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdYt−1)
− 1
))
+ εt
)
,
(14)
where εt is is a sequence of independent, identically distributed random normal variables, with
zero mean and variance s2 = (εOt + ε
P
t )
2/(2µ)2.
In analyzing the stochastic version of our model, we aim at showing that several stylized facts
of financial markets may be retrieved that, in turn, can possibly affect the behavior of the real
sector. Thanks to their apparent explanatory power, models that have been being developed
with interacting agents and interconnected sectors are increasingly used as tools for economic
policy recommendations (see e.g. [9, 11, 27]).
In what follows, we consider the price returns, defined as
Rt = log(Pt)− log(Pt−1),
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Figure 8: Kurtosis of returns distribution in the (β, ω)-plane. Different colors are associated with
different kurtosis values, according to the colors bar. The distributions of returns exhibits the fat-
tail property (with more probability mass in the tails than warranted by a normal distribution with
identical mean and standard deviation) with the highest kurtosis levels obtained for values of the
intensity of choice β roughly between 2 and 4.
focusing, at first, on the deviation from normality of their distribution. In all the simulations
reported in this subsection we employ the same parameter setting adopted for Figure 4. Figure
8 displays the values of the kurtosis in the distributions of the log-returns as the parameters β
and ω jointly vary. We observe that, independently of the degree of interaction between the two
markets, as the intensity of choice increases from 2 to 4, the kurtosis increases as well, reaching
values that reveal a non-normal distribution of the log-returns. In fact, kurtosis measures how
fat the tails of the distributions are compared to the ones of a normal distribution. In this
respect, to observe fat tails it is essential to have trajectories in which prices move frequently
far from their average and, in turn, this is related to the behavior of the intensity of choice β.
For example, looking at Figure 4, we observe that, as β increases, coexisting attractors appear,
due to the occurrence of the pitchfork bifurcation, and this reflects into a large kurtosis, e.g.
for 2 < β < 4 roughly. As β increases further, the bifurcation diagram of Figure 4 shows that
the dynamics turn into chaotic and this translates into slightly reduced values for the kurtosis
in the log-returns of the stochastic version of the model. Such results are confirmed also by
the top and bottom left panels of the Figure 9, obtained for ω = 0 and ω = 1, respectively. As
the degree of market interaction grows, the switching between the optimistic and pessimistic
strategies towards the best performing rule is able to increase the kurtosis in the distributions
of the log-returns.
Another peculiar stylized fact of returns’ times series is the volatility clustering, namely, the
occurrence of several consecutive periods characterized by high volatility alternated with others
characterized by low volatility. This is graphically evident from the central panels of Figure 9,
in which a typical example of time series of returns, obtained for the parameter setting used
for Figure 4 and s = 0.15P ∗/F , is reported. Finally, volatility clustering is highlighted by
the typical strongly positive, slowly decreasing autocorrelation coefficients of absolute returns,
reported in the right top and bottom panels of Figure 9.
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Figure 9: The left column represents the evolution of kurtosis when ω = 0 (A) and ω = 1 (D), the
central column plots the time series of absolute returns exhibiting phases of high volatility alternating
with phases of low volatility either for ω = 0 (B) or ω = 1 (E), the right column shows the auto-
correlation function for absolute returns for ω = 0 (C) and ω = 1 (F) obtained for β = 6, revealing
evidence for volatility clustering.
Overall, we may come up with the conclusion that the stochastic version of our model with
interacting real and financial sectors is able to replicate key empirical regularities of actual
stock markets. In particular, the functioning of the stochastic version of the model descends
from the functioning of its deterministic counterpart. In the deterministic setup, endogenous
dynamics arise when a model parameter crosses the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation boundary, as
well as coexisting attractors appear when the pitchfork bifurcation takes place. In the stochastic
version, when the two non-fundamental steady states appear and are still locally stable, the
interplay of nonlinear elements and random shocks leads to realistic dynamics.
5 Conclusions
The proposed model shows that beliefs can influence the possible final outcomes of an economy
not only in terms of increasing the complexity in the possible endogenous dynamics of the
economic variables, but also in a more constitutive way. From the static point of view, strongly
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heterogeneous expectations can alter the set of steady states, originating strongly polarized
multiple steady states that in turn reflect the optimism/pessimism of the beliefs. This can then
dynamically evolve into complex attractors still characterized by optimism/pessimism of the
beliefs, provided that such bias is strong and relevant enough. To sum up, it is certainly evident
the role played by the occurrence of the pitchfork bifurcation, with the optimistic/pessimistic
steady states common to the various sets of simulations. But this is not the sole effect. From a
broader perspective, the occurrence of such biased steady states coexisting with the unbiased
one is the result of the repeated strategies’ evaluation made by the agents, which may lead the
economy to converge to high, intermediate or low, steady or endogenously fluctuating, levels
of national income (and prices as well), with the consequent richness of dynamical behaviors
related to all equilibria and their eventual destabilization.
The investigation, performed with a mix of analytical, numerical and empirical tools, has a
twofold aim: besides understanding the influence of the beliefs on the course of the economy in
terms of possible final outcomes and stability of the desired equilibrium level of national income
and prices, we are interested in the role of market integration and in its possible beneficial
effect on the overall economy in terms of increasing level of national income. We showed that
an increase of market interaction may be either beneficial, as it may increase the national
income of the economy, or it may generate a contraction in its level, as no real benefits to
the society deriving from the activities based on an increased integration may be appraised.
The potential beneficial effect of the degree of interaction seems to emerge also from the local
stability analysis, with the found stabilizing effect of the interaction degree for suitable values of
the intensity of choice parameter, which measures agents’ reactivity toward the best performing
strategy. This interplay between interaction, imitation and beliefs is crucial also in view of
understanding and interpreting the stylized facts that our model is able to reproduce when
buffeted with stochastic noise, like the recurrent boom-bust phenomena observed in the real
financial markets together with several stylized facts regarding stock price returns, such as
positive autocorrelation, volatility clustering and non-normal distribution characterized by a
high kurtosis and fat tails.
The proposed model belongs to a class of models that, we believe, may be useful in order to
interpret and understand the recent developments in the increasingly interconnected economy,
which constitutes a true challenge for regulatory measures which seek to appease abrupt market
fluctuations. We hope that our work will stimulate further investigations in such direction,
especially as concerns the deepening of the understanding of the role of the agents’ beliefs. The
financial crisis at the end of the last decade has not only made evident that our comprehension
of the dynamics of real and financial markets is still incomplete, but it has also revealed how
important is to intensify the research activity in this field.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. In order to find the steady states, we set Pt+1 = Pt = P, Yt+1 = Yt = Y
and Zt+1 = Zt = Z in (5). From (5c) we have Z = Y. Inserting it in (5a) and (5b) since,
recalling (1a), we have that gI(0) = 0 and that gP (z) = 0 is solved by z = 0 only, we obtain

Y = A + cY + ωhP,
(1− ω)F ∗ + ωdY − P + b
(
2
1 + e−4bβ(P−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdY )
− 1
)
= 0.
(15a)
(15b)
The steady state existing independently of β and b is found setting P = (1− ω)F ∗ + ωdY,
which immediately provides (Y, P, Z) = (Y ∗, P ∗, Z∗) = S∗, whose components, by (7), are
positive independently of ω.
In order to verify the existence of additional steady states, we notice that, from (15a),
national income Y can be rewritten as a function of the asset price P as
Y =
A + ωhP
1− c . (16)
Inserting such expression in (15b), we find the following equation in P, whose solutions are the
steady state values of price:(
1− ω
2dh
1− c
)
P − (1− ω)F ∗ − ωdA
1− c + b−
2b
1 + e
−4bβ
((
1−ω2dh
1−c
)
P−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdA
1−c
) = 0. (17)
Defining
f1(P ) ≡
(
1− ω
2dh
1− c
)
P − (1− ω)F ∗ − ωdA
1− c + b (18)
and
f2(P ) ≡ 2b
1 + e
−4bβ
((
1−ω2dh
1−c
)
P−(1−ω)F ∗−ωdA
1−c
) , (19)
we observe that f1 is a straight line that crosses the horizontal axis of the Cartesian coordinate
plane at the point Pℓ =
(1−c)(1−ω)F ∗+ωdA−(1−c)b
1−c−ω2dh and the vertical axis at f1(0) = b− (1− ω)F ∗−
ωdA
1−c . We stress that such points can be either positive or negative and that the function f1 is
increasing in P . In fact, thanks to the positivity condition for the steady state P ∗, we have
1− ω2dh
1−c > 0.
Simple computations allow to conclude that f2 is an increasing function in P and it has an
inflection point at P = P ∗, it is convex for P ∈ (−∞, P ∗) and concave for P ∈ (P ∗, +∞) .
Moreover, f2(P ) crosses the vertical axis at the point f2(0) =
2b
1+e
4bβ((1−ω)F∗+ωdA1−c )
. We always
find f1 (P
∗) = f2 (P
∗) and, according to the values assumed by the model parameters, f1 and
f2 can also meet at some points P
L and PH , with PL ∈ (Pℓ, P ∗) and PH ∈ (P ∗, Ph) , where
Ph is the intersection point between the horizontal line g(P ) = 2b and f1(P ). Recalling the
expression of P ∗, it is easy to see that Pℓ and Ph respectively correspond to the left and right
bounds for P in (8). In order to determine the bounds on Y, it is possible to proceed as done
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for P, obtaining an equation like (17) from (15), this time in terms of Y.
More precisely, since f1 is an increasing straight line and f2 is an increasing function in P , with
an inflection point at P = P ∗, being convex for P ∈ (−∞, P ∗) and concave for P ∈ (P ∗, +∞) ,
then if f ′1(P
∗) ≥ f ′2(P ∗) we have exactly one solution to (17), that is, P = P ∗, while if
f ′1(P
∗) < f ′2(P
∗) we have exactly three distinct solutions, PL, P ∗ and PH , to (17). We notice
that f ′1(P
∗) < f ′2(P
∗) corresponds to
1− ω
2dh
1− c < 2b
2β
(
1− ω
2dh
1− c
)
,
which, recalling (7), reduces to (6).
To guarantee the economic meaningfulness of PH and PL, we require their positivity. A
sufficient condition to ensure this consists in setting Pℓ > 0, which is verified for each ω ∈ [0, 1]
when b(1 − c) < min{dA, F ∗(1 − c)}. Since f2(P ) is strictly positive and f1(P ) is strictly
increasing, their intersection is realized for P > 0.
Finally, it is easy to show that f1 and f2 are symmetric w.r.t. P = P
∗, i.e., that fi(P
∗ +
ε) − fi(P ∗) = fi(P ∗) − fi(P ∗ − ε), for every ε > 0 and i ∈ {1, 2}. For f1 that is true because
it is a straight line, while for f2 a direct computation shows that f2(P
∗ + ε) − f2(P ∗) =
f2(P
∗)− f2(P ∗ − ε) = b
(
e4bβε(1−
ω2dh
1−c
) − 1)/(e4bβε(1−ω2dh1−c ) + 1).
We then have that, when (6) holds, (17) is solved not only by P ∗, but also by PL and PH ,
symmetric values w.r.t. P ∗. From (16) and since in the steady states we have Z = Y, it follows
that national income positively depends on the asset price and thus to PL and PH correspond
Y L and Y H , with Y L < Y ∗ < Y H , as well as ZL and ZH , with ZL < Z∗ < ZH . Moreover, if
PH and PL are positive, then, from (16) , Y H , Y L, ZH and ZL are positive, too. Finally, by
the linearity of (16) and by the symmetry of PL and PH w.r.t. P ∗, it follows that Y L and Y H
are symmetric w.r.t. Y ∗, and, since in the steady states we have Z = Y, then ZL and ZH are
symmetric w.r.t. Z∗. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start noting that, from (16), Y positively depends on P , so it is
sufficient to study the monotonicity for P on varying either β or b. Setting
W =
(
1− ω
2dh
1− c
)
P − (1− ω)F ∗ − ωdA
1− c, (20)
we may rewrite (17) as
W + b =
2b
1 + e−4bβW
, (21)
from which it follows that
e−4bβW =
b−W
b+W
. (22)
Moreover, it holds that
W =
1− c− ω2dh
1− c (P − P
∗). (23)
For W ∈ (−b, b) on both sides of equation (22) there are positive, strictly decreasing func-
tions of W and the rhs of (22) is also independent of β. In what follows, we make reference to
some explanatory plots reported in Figure 10.
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Firstly we consider PH(β). From (8) we have thatWH(β), defined by (23), belongs to (0, b).
Setting W ∈ (0, b), the lhs of (22) is decreasing with respect to β, so that if β1 < β2 we find
e−4bβ1W > e−4bβ2W . An illustrative example is reported in Figure 10 (A), from which it is evident
that the last inequality guarantees that the unique solution WH(β) of (22) on (0, b) increases
with β, and hence, recalling (23), PH(β) increases, too. We proceed in a similar way for PL.
From (8), we have that WL(β), defined by (23), belongs to (−b, 0). Setting W ∈ (−b, 0), the
lhs of (22) is increasing with respect to β, so that if β1 < β2 we find e
−4bβ1W < e−4bβ2W .
An illustrative example is reported in Figure 10 (B), from which it is evident that the last
inequality guarantees that the unique solution WL(β) of (22) on (−b, 0) decreases with β, and
hence, recalling (23), PL(β) decreases, too. The two limits of P j, j ∈ {H,L}, as β → +∞ can
be easily obtained by noting that the lhs of (22) pointwise approaches 0 for each W ∈ (0, b),
so that WH(β) tends to b, and the lhs of (22) pointwise approaches +∞ for each W ∈ (−b, 0),
so that WL(β) tends to −b. Using (23) allows concluding. For the limits of Y j, j ∈ {H,L}, it
is sufficient to compute the limit as β → +∞ of the rhs of (16), in which we replace P with
either PH or PL and we use the just computed limits.
To study the monotonicity of PL(b) and PH(b) with respect to b, we rewrite (22) as
e−4βW =
(
b−W
b+W
)1/b
, (24)
which is well defined on W ∈ (−b, b) and shares the solutions with (23). The lhs is represented
by a positive, strictly decreasing function of W. Let us consider b1 < b2 and the corresponding
steady states PH(b1) and P
H(b2). From (8) we have that W
H(b1) and W
H(b2), defined by (23),
respectively belong to (0, b1) and (0, b2). For W ∈ (0, b1), noting that b1−Wb1+W < b2−Wb2+W , we find(
b1−W
b1+W
)1/b1
<
(
b2−W
b2+W
)1/b2
. An illustrative example is reported in Figure 10 (C), from which
it is evident that the last inequality allows concluding that if WH(b2) ∈ (0, b1) it holds that
WH(b1) < W
H(b2) (indeed, also if W
H(b2) ∈ [b1, b2), since we have WH(b1) ∈ (0, b1)). This
implies that WH(b) increases with b, and hence, recalling (23), PH(b) increases, too.
Now we turn our attention to PL(b1) and P
L(b2), still assuming b1 < b2. From (8) we
have that WL(b1) and W
L(b2), defined by (23), respectively belong to (−b1, 0) and (−b2, 0).
For W ∈ (−b1, 0), noting that b1−Wb1+W > b2−Wb2+W , we find
(
b1−W
b1+W
)1/b1
>
(
b2−W
b2+W
)1/b2
. An illustrative
example is reported in Figure 10 (D), from which it is evident that the last inequality allows
concluding that if WL(b2) ∈ (−b1, 0) it holds that WL(b1) > WL(b2) (indeed, also if WL(b2) ∈
(−b2,−b1], since we have WL(b1) ∈ (−b1, 0)). This implies that WL(b) decreases with b, and
hence, recalling (23), PL(b) decreases, too.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us start focusing on the effects of ω on P ∗. A direct computation
shows that
∂P ∗
∂ω
=
dh(dA− F ∗(1− c))ω2 + 2dhF ∗(1− c)ω + (1− c)(dA− F ∗(1− c))
(1− c− ω2dh)2 .
Such derivative is non-negative for each ω ∈ [0, 1] when dA − F ∗(1 − c) ≥ 0 and in this case
P ∗ increases with ω, for every ω. When instead dA− F ∗(1− c) < 0, the numerator of ∂P ∗/∂ω
may become negative. More precisely, ∂P ∗/∂ω > 0 is equivalent to dh(F ∗(1 − c) − dA)ω2 −
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Figure 10: (A), (B): Intersections between the function representing the rhs of (22) (black)
and two functions representing the lhs of (22) respectively for β = β1 (blue) and β = β2 > β1
(red), when W ∈ (0, b) (plot (A)) and W ∈ (−b, 0) (plot (B)). (C),(D): Intersections between
the function representing the lhs of (24) (black) and two functions representing the rhs of
(24) respectively for b = b1 (blue) and b = b2 > b1 (red), when W ∈ (0, b1) (plot (C)) and
W ∈ (−b1, 0) (plot (D)).
2dhF ∗(1− c)ω+(1− c)(F ∗(1− c)−dA) < 0. When the discriminant of dh(F ∗(1− c)−dA)ω2−
2dhF ∗(1 − c)ω + (1 − c)(F ∗(1 − c)− dA) = 0 is non-positive, we have that P ∗ decreases with
ω, for each ω ∈ [0, 1]. When instead the discriminant is positive, it is easy to show that there
are two positive solutions ω1,2 to such equation, and the larger between them always exceeds 1.
Hence, if the smallest solution ω1 is larger than 1, then P
∗ decreases with ω, for each ω ∈ [0, 1].
If instead ω1 lies in (0, 1), then P
∗ decreases with ω on [0, ω1) and increases with ω on (ω1, 1].
Setting ωP ∗ = ω1, we obtain the desired result on P
∗.
As concerns Y ∗, a direct computation shows that
∂Y ∗
∂ω
=
h(ω2dhF ∗ + 2ω(dA− F ∗(1− c)) + F ∗(1− c))
(1− c− ω2dh)2 .
Such derivative is positive for each ω ∈ [0, 1] when dA − F ∗(1 − c) ≥ 0 and in this case Y ∗
increases with ω, for every ω. When instead dA − F ∗(1 − c) < 0, the numerator of ∂Y ∗/∂ω
may become negative. More precisely, when the discriminant of ω2dhF ∗ + 2ω(dA − F ∗(1 −
c))+F ∗(1− c) = 0 is non-positive, we have that Y ∗ increases with ω, for each ω ∈ [0, 1]. When
instead the discriminant is positive, it is easy to show that there are two positive solutions
ω3,4 to such equation, and the largest between them always exceeds 1. Hence, if the smallest
solution ω3 is larger than 1, then Y
∗ increases with ω, for each ω ∈ [0, 1]. If instead ω3 lies in
(0, 1), then Y ∗ increases with ω on [0, ω3) and decreases with ω on (ω3, 1]. Setting ωY ∗ = ω3,
we obtain the desired result on Y ∗.
Let us now assume 1/
√
2β < b < min{dA/(1− c), F ∗}, namely (6) is violated and (9) holds
true, so that the two additional steady states 0 < PL(ω) < PH(ω) exist for every ω ∈ [0, 1].
In order to analyze their behavior with respect to increasing values of ω, we use the implicit
function theorem. Let f : (0,+∞)× (0, 1)→ R, (P, ω) 7→ f(P, ω), be defined by the lhs of (17)
and let P : (0, 1)→ (0,+∞), ω 7→ P (ω), be the function which associates to ω ∈ (0, 1) one of
the solutions implicitly defined by f(P, ω) = 0 for b > 1/
√
2β. Recalling the definition of W in
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(20), we then have
∂f
∂P
=
(1− c− dhω2)(1 + 2(1− 4b2β)e−4bβW + e−8bβW )
(1− c)(e−4bβW + 1)2
and
∂f
∂ω
=
(−Ad + F − Fc− 2Pdhω)(1 + 2(1− 4b2β)e−4bβW + e−8bβW )
(1− c)(e−4bβW + 1)2 .
We can apply the implicit function theorem to investigate how the steady state values for
P depend on ω provided that
1 + 2(1− 4b2β)e−4bβW + e−8bβW 6= 0. (25)
Setting Z = e−4bβW = (b−W )/(b+W ), condition (25) can be rewritten as 1+2(1−4b2β)Z+Z2 6=
0, or equivalently
4b2(2βW 2 − 2βb2 + 1)
(W + b)2
6= 0,
which holds true if and only if 2βW 2 − 2βb2 + 1 6= 0. Recalling (23), the last inequality can be
rewritten as
P 6= P ∗ ± 1− c
1− c− ω2dh
√
b2 − 1
2β
. (26)
By the symmetry of PL and PH with respect to P ∗, (26) is satisfied if (10) holds true for each
ω ∈ (0, 1). Under such assumption we have that, since P (ω) is well-defined for ω ∈ (0, 1), then,
by the implicit function theorem, it is continuously differentiable for each ω ∈ (0, 1) and it
holds that
P ′(ω) = −
∂f
∂ω
∂f
∂P
=
Ad− F (1− c) + 2P (ω)dhω
1− c− dhω2 . (27)
From now on, to fix ideas, we focus on PL(ω) : analogous arguments hold for PH(ω), as well.
If Ad−F (1−c) > 0, then (PL)′ (ω) > 0 on (0, 1) and PL(ω) is strictly increasing for ω ∈ (0, 1).
Conversely, if Ad−F (1− c) < 0, then (PL)′ (0) < 0 : if (PL)′ (ω) < 0 for each ω ∈ (0, 1), then
PL(ω) is strictly decreasing on (0, 1), otherwise there exists ωPL ∈ (0, 1) such that
PL(ωPL) =
F (1− c)− Ad
2dhωPL
. (28)
If such ωPL ∈ (0, 1) exists, PL is decreasing on (0, ωPL) and
(
PL
)′
(ωPL) = 0. Since
(
PL
)′′
(ω) =
2dhω(Ad− F (1− c) + 2dhωPL(ω))
(1− c− dhω2)2 +
2dhωP ′L(ω) + 2dhPL(ω)
1− c− dhω2 ,
we have (
PL
)′′
(ωPL) =
2dhPL(ωPL)
1− c− dhω2
PL
> 0
and thus ωPL is a minimum point. As P
′(ω) positively depends on P (ω)ω, if ω increases
and P (ω) is increasing, by the continuity of P ′(ω) there cannot exist ω̂L ∈ (ωPL, 1) with
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P ′(ω̂L) ≤ 0. This allows us to conclude that PL(ω) is strictly increasing on (ωPL, 1).We remark
that ωPL, ωPH and ωP ∗ do not necessarily exist for the same parameter values. Indeed, from
(28) it follows that ωP j is inversely proportional to P
j(ωP j), for j ∈ {L,H, ∗}. Since for each
ω ∈ [0, 1] we have PL(ω) < P ∗(ω) < PH(ω), it holds that ωPL > ωP ∗ > ωPH . Hence, the first
to (possibly) enter from above the interval (0, 1) is ωPH , (possibly) followed by ωP ∗ , (possibly)
followed by ωPL.
As concerns Y, to fix ideas, we will just focus on Y L, as analogous arguments hold for Y H ,
as well.
Recalling (16) and (27), we have that
(
Y L
)′
(ω) =
h
1− c
(
PL(ω) + ω
(
PL
)′
(ω)
)
=
h
(
PL(ω)dhω2 + ω(dA− F ∗(1− c)) + PL(ω)(1− c))
(1− c)(1− c− dhω2) .
(29)
Such derivative is positive for each ω ∈ (0, 1) when dA− F ∗(1− c) ≥ 0 and in this case Y L(ω)
increases with ω, for every ω. When instead dA − F ∗(1 − c) < 0, the numerator of (Y L)′ (ω)
may become negative. More precisely,
(
Y L
)′
(0) > 0. If
(
Y L
)′
(ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ (0, 1), then
Y L is strictly increasing on (0, 1). Otherwise there exists ωY L ∈ (0, 1) such that
PL(ωY L) =
ωY L(F (1− c)− Ad)
1− c + dhω2
Y L
. (30)
If such ωY L ∈ (0, 1) exists, then Y L is increasing on (0, ωY L) and
(
Y L
)′
(ωY L) = 0. Since
(
Y L
)′′
(ωY L) =
h
(
(1− c+ dhω2Y L)
(
PL
)′
(ωY L) + 2hdωP
L(ωY L)− F (1− c) + Ad
)
(1− c)(1− c− dhω2
Y L
)
,
recalling (27) and (30) we find
(
Y L
)′′
(ωY L) =
2h(Ad− F (1− c))
(1− c+ dhω2
Y L
)(1− c− dhω2
Y L
)
< 0.
Hence, ωY L is a local maximum point. Actually, it is a global maximum point, i.e., Y
L increases
on (0, ωY L) and decreases on (ωY L, 1). Indeed, if for some ω0 ∈ (ωY L , 1) we have
(
Y L
)′
(ω0) < 0,
then, by (29), it follows that
PL(ω0) <
ω0(F (1− c)−Ad)
1− c+ dhω20
.
If by contradiction there exists ω2 > ω0 where Y
L is increasing, then
(
Y L
)′
(ω2) > 0. By the
continuity of
(
Y L
)′
there must exists at least an ω1 ∈ (ω0, ω2) in which Y ′(ω1) = 0. Let us
assume that ω1 is the smallest value of ω for which this happens, so that
(
Y L
)′
(ω) < 0 on
[ω0, ω1). We notice that, under the maintained assumption that F (1− c)− Ad > 0, the map
φ : (0, 1)→ R, ω 7→ ω(F (1− c)−Ad)
1− c+ dhω2
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is strictly increasing with ω. Then, since ωY L < ω1, we have
PL(ωY L) =
ωY L(F (1− c)− Ad)
1− c+ dhω2
Y L
< PL(ω1) =
ω1(F (1− c)− Ad)
1− c+ dhω21
. (31)
Recalling that, when F (1−c)−Ad > 0, PL can be either decreasing for every ω ∈ (0, 1) or there
exists ωPL ∈ (0, 1) such that PL decreases on [0, ωPL) and increases on (ωPL, 1), it follows that
(31) excludes the first possibility. Hence, PL increases on (ωPL, 1) and it holds that ωPL < ω1
as PL is increasing at ω = ω1. Since by (16), when P
L increases, Y L increases, too, we have
that Y L starts increasing in a left neighborhood of ω1, against the assumption on ω1. Hence,
Y L increases on (0, ωY L) and decreases on (ωY L , 1), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to use the conditions in [10] to prove (11) we need to compute
the Jacobian matrix J∗ for the map G in (5) in correspondence to S∗.We have that the Jacobian
matrix of G is
J =

 γg′I(Y − Z) + c hω −γg′I(Y − Z)j21 j22 0
1 0 0

 (32)
where
j21 =µσg
′
P
(
−µ
(
P + F (ω − 1)− b
(
2
e−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω) + 1
− 1
)
− Y dω
))
·
(
dω − 8b
2βdωe−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω)
(e−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω) + 1)2
) (33a)
and
j22 =µσ
(
8b2βe−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω)
(e−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω) + 1)2
− 1
)
· g′P
(
−µ
(
P + F (ω − 1)− b
(
2
e−4bβ(P+F (ω−1)−Y dω) + 1
− 1
)
− Y dω
))
+ 1.
(33b)
Recalling that from (1b) we have g′I(0) = g
′
P (0) = 1, J
∗ reads as
J∗ =

 c+ γ ωh −γωdE 1− E 0
1 0 0

 (34)
The Farebrother conditions are the following:
i) 1 + C1 + C2 + C3 > 0
ii) 1− C1 + C2 − C3 > 0
iii) 1− C2 + C1C3 − (C3)2 > 0
iv) 3− C2 < 0
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where Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial λ3+C1λ2+C2λ+C3 =
0. From the Jacobian matrix (34), we find that the characteristic equation is given by
λ3 + (−c− γ − 1 + E) λ2 + (2γ + c− cE − γE − ω2dhE)λ+ (−γ + Eγ) = 0
which immediately provides C1, C2 and C3. Replacing their expressions in i)− iv) allows con-
cluding the proof after some simple algebraic manipulations. We just notice that i) provides
E (1− c− ω2dh) > 0 which, recalling assumption (7), can be simplified as E > 0, i.e., (11a).
Proof of Proposition 5. We describe in detail only the scenarios arising on varying β, since,
recalling that E = σµ(1− 2b2β), the role of b is equivalent to that of β.
Collecting E in (11) we find the following system:

E > 0
−E(dhω2 + c+ 2γ + 1) + 2c+ 4γ + 2 > 0
γ(1− γ)E2 + ((c− γ)(1− γ) + dhω2)E + (1− c)(1− γ) > 0
E(dhω2 + c+ γ)− 2γ − c+ 3 > 0
(35)
We start solving System (35) with respect to E ∈ R under assumption (7). Then we will rewrite
the solutions in terms of the positive parameter β.
Recalling (7), the first inequality in (35) requires E > 0, while the second inequality can be
rewritten as
E <
2c+ 4γ + 2
dhω2 + c+ 2γ + 1
= E2
and the fourth inequality is equivalent to
E >
2γ + c− 3
dhω2 + c+ γ
= E4.
Combining these three conditions we obtain
max{0, E4} < E < E2 . (36)
Concerning the third condition in (35), we distinguish three cases:
a) γ = 1. We start noting that we have E4 < 0, so that condition (36) reduces to
0 < E < E2 . (37)
The third inequality in (35) reduces to Edhω2 > 0, i.e. E > 0, so that System (35) is solved
for 0 < E < E2, i.e.,
1
2b2
(
1− E2
µσ
)
< β <
1
2b2
, (38)
which means that if µσ < E2 we are in the destabilizing scenario, since the left inequality in
(38) is always fulfilled, while if µσ > E2 we obtain the mixed scenario.
b) γ < 1. We again have E4 < 0, so that condition (36) reduces to (37). The lhs of the third
inequality in (35) represents a convex parabola, intersecting the vertical axis at (1−c)(1−γ) > 0.
If the discriminant is negative, the inequality is fulfilled by any E, so that System (35) is solved
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when (37) holds, from which we obtain the same possible scenarios considered in case a). If the
discriminant is positive, in principle, we may have two situations, i.e., (c−γ)(1−γ)+dhω2 > 0
and (c− γ)(1− γ) + dhω2 ≤ 0. If (c− γ)(1− γ) + dhω2, representing the slope of the parabola
at its intersection point with the vertical axis, is positive then the third inequality is solved by
E < Ea3 ∨E > Eb3, where Ea,b3 are the (negative) roots of the lhs of the third inequality in (35).
This means that simultaneously considering E < Ea3 ∨ E > Eb3 and (37), System (35) is again
solved when (37) holds true and we obtain the same scenarios as before.
If (c− γ)(1− γ) + dhω2 ≤ 0 the discriminant of the lhs of the third inequality of (35) can
not be positive. In fact we have
γ(1− γ)E2 + ((c− γ)(1− γ) + dhω2)E + (1− c)(1− γ) > (1− γ) (γE2 + (c− γ)E + (1− c))
and the rhs is strictly positive. To show this, it is enough to note that the discriminant of
γE2 + (c− γ)E + (1− c), given by
c2 + 2cγ + γ2 − 4γ = c2 − γ + 2γ(c− 1) + γ(γ − 1),
is negative since c < 1, γ < 1 and, in order to have (c − γ)(1 − γ) + dhω2 ≤ 0, we necessarily
need c ≤ γ, which, together with γ < 1, guarantees c2 < γ.
If the discriminant of the lhs of the third inequality in (35) is negative or null, by the same
arguments used above, it follows that the third inequality in (35) is fulfilled by any value of
E > 0 and we obtain again the scenarios arising in case a).
c) γ > 1. In this case the lhs of the third inequality in (35) represents a concave parabola,
intersecting the vertical axis at (1 − c)(1 − γ) < 0. If the discriminant is negative, the in-
equality is never fulfilled, and we have the unconditionally unstable scenario. Conversely, if the
discriminant is positive, the third inequality is solved by Ea3 < E < E
b
3, which combined with
(36) provides max{0, E4, Ea3} < E < min{E2, Eb3}, that is qualitatively identical to (36). This
allows concluding that no other scenarios can arise.
Proof of Proposition 6. We start making ω explicit in System (11), which can then be rewritten
as follows: 

E > 0
ω2 < (2−E)(1+c+2γ)
dhE
ω2 > c−cE+γ−1+Eγ−γc−Eγ
2−E2γ+Eγc+E2γ2
dhE
ω2 > 2γ+c−cE−γE−3
dhE
Accordingly, the second inequality is never fulfilled if E ≥ 2, while it is fulfilled for
0 ≤ ω <
√
(2−E) (1 + c+ 2γ)
dhE
≡ ω2 (39)
if 0 < E < 2. As concerns the third and the fourth inequalities, they are always fulfilled if the
numerators on the rhs are negative, while they are respectively satisfied for
1 ≥ ω >
√
(γ − 1)(γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c)
dhE
≡ ω3
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and
1 ≥ ω >
√
2γ + c− cE − γE − 3
dhE
≡ ω4
when both numerators are non-negative. In particular, we have that the numerator of ω4 is
non-negative, i.e., 2γ + c− cE − γE − 3 ≥ 0, when γ > (3− c)/2 and 0 < E ≤ 2γ+c−3
c+γ
. On the
other hand, it holds that the numerator of ω3 is non-negative, i.e.,
(γ − 1)(γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c) ≥ 0, (40)
when γ = 1, when γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c ≥ 0 if γ > 1, and when γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c ≤ 0
if γ < 1. We notice that real solutions to γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c = 0 exist only if
∆ = γ2 − 2(2− c)γ + c2 ≥ 0 ⇔ γ ≤ γ1 ∨ γ ≥ γ2, (41)
with γ1 ≡ 2− c− 2
√
1− c and γ2 ≡ 2− c+ 2
√
1− c that fulfill
0 < γ1 < c < 1 < γ2. (42)
Condition (40) is then satisfied by any E > 0 when γ = 1 or when γ > 1 and ∆ < 0, which,
recalling (41) and (42), jointly provide 1 < γ < γ2. Hence, we can conclude that condition (40)
is fulfilled by any E > 0 when γ ∈ [1, γ2).
If γ > 1 and ∆ ≥ 0 (which jointly require γ ≥ γ2) then (40) is fulfilled for 0 < E ≤ E1 ≡ γ−c−
√
∆
2γ
or for E ≥ E2 ≡ γ−c+
√
∆
2γ
.
Conversely, if γ ≥ γ2 but E ∈ (E1, E2), (40) does not hold true, and thus iii) is fulfilled for any ω.
If γ < 1 and ∆ > 0 (namely, if γ < γ1), we have that (40) holds true for E ∈ (E1, E2) ⊂ (−∞, 0)
since γE2 − (γ − c)E + 1− c is a convex parabola, increasing at the positive intersection 1− c
with the vertical axis, since, recalling (42), −(γ−c) > 0. Hence (40) is never satisfied for E > 0
when γ < γ1 and iii) is fulfilled again for any ω. The same conclusion holds true if γ < 1 and
∆ ≤ 0 (namely, if γ1 ≤ γ < 1).
Summarizing, we have that6:
i) is fulfilled for E > 0;
ii) is fulfilled for 0 ≤ ω < ω2 and 0 < E < 2;
iii) is fulfilled for any value of ω ∈ [0, 1], if γ ∈ (0, 1), or if γ ≥ γ2 and E ∈ (E1, E2);
iii) is fulfilled for 1 ≥ ω > ω3, if γ ∈ [1, γ2), or if γ ≥ γ2 and E ∈ (0, E1] ∪ [E2,+∞);
iv) is fulfilled for any value of ω ∈ [0, 1], if E > 2γ+c−3
γ+c
;
iv) is fulfilled for 1 ≥ ω > ω4, if γ > (3− c)/2 and 0 < E ≤ 2γ+c−3c+γ .
Hence, each condition in (11) is fulfilled on an interval for ω. Since the intersection of
intervals is an (empty or nonempty) interval, the set on which S∗ is locally asymptotically
stable is connected. Thus, the only scenarios that may be possibly detected on increasing ω
are the unconditionally unstable, unconditionally stable, destabilizing, stabilizing and mixed
(meaning unstable-stable-unstable) scenarios.
6We stress that, in order to simplify the description of the conditions under which ii)–iv) are fulfilled, we
report just the cases with E > 0, so that also i) is satisfied.
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In particular, the unconditionally unstable scenario occurs, e.g., when E ≡ µσ (1− 2b2β) < 0,
that is, for b > 1/
√
2β, as in this case (11a) is violated and S∗ is unstable for each value of ω.
Recalling assumption (7), the unconditionally stable scenario occurs, for instance, when
γ ∈ (0, 1) and E ∈ (0, 2(1+c+2γ)
dh+1+c+2γ
)
. In fact, under such conditions, recalling the definition of ω2
in (39) and that c ∈ (0, 1), we have 2 > 2(1+c+2γ)
dh+1+c+2γ
> E > 0 > c−1
1+c
> 2γ+c−3
γ+c
and ω2 > 1.
Hence, the dynamical system is locally asymptotically stable at S∗ for each ω ∈ [0, 1].
Recalling assumption (7), the destabilizing scenario occurs, for instance, when γ ∈ (0, 1) and
E ∈ ( 2(1+c+2γ)
dh+1+c+2γ
, 2
)
. In fact, under such conditions, we have 2 > E > 2(1+c+2γ)
dh+1+c+2γ
> 0 > c−1
1+c
>
2γ+c−3
γ+c
and 0 < ω2 < 1. Hence, the system is locally asymptotically stable at S
∗ for ω ∈ [0, ω2)
and unstable for ω ∈ (ω2, 1].
Still under assumption (7), the stabilizing scenario occurs, for instance, when γ ∈ [1, (3 −
c)/2), E ∈ (0, 2) and dh ∈ (max{0, L},min{R, 1− c}), where7
L = (γ − 1)
[
1− c
E
+ Eγ − γ + c
]
, R =
(2−E)(1 + c+ 2γ)
E
. (43)
Namely, under such conditions, we have 2 > E > 0 > 2γ+c−3
γ+c
, γ2 > (3 − c)/2 > γ ≥ 1 and
0 < ω3 < 1 < ω2, since dh > L is equivalent to ω3 < 1 while dh < R is equivalent to ω2 > 1.
Hence, the system is locally asymptotically stable at S∗ for ω ∈ (ω3, 1] and unstable for ω ∈
[0, ω3).
Recalling (7) and the definition of R in (43), the mixed scenario occurs, for instance, when γ ∈
[1, (3−c)/2), E ∈ (0, 2), dh ∈ (R, 1−c) and (E2−E)γ2+(3E−c−3−E2+Ec)γ+E−3−c < 0. 8
Namely, under such conditions, we have 2 > E > 0 > 2γ+c−3
γ+c
, γ2 > (3− c)/2 > γ ≥ 1, 0 < ω3 <
ω2 < 1. Hence, the system is locally asymptotically stable at S
∗ for ω ∈ (ω3, ω2) and unstable
for ω ∈ [0, ω3) ∪ (ω2, 1].
Proof of Proposition 7. We start showing that evaluating the Jacobian matrix of G in (5) at
either SL or SH we obtain the Jacobian matrices JL and JH whose structure is very similar to
that of J∗ in (34). Indeed, the first and the third rows of both JL and JH coincide with those
of J∗. Now we evaluate j21 and j22, respectively defined in (33a) and (33b), at S
L or at SH .
We start noting that, recalling (16) and (21), we can rewrite j21 and j22 as
j21 = ωdµσ
(
1− 8b
2βe−4Wbβ
(e−4Wbβ + 1)2
)
g′P
(
−µ
(
W + b− 2b
e−4Wbβ + 1
))
and
j22 = µσ
(
8b2βe−4Wbβ
(e−4Wbβ + 1)2
− 1
)
g′P
(
−µ
(
W + b− 2b
e−4Wbβ + 1
))
+ 1.
From (21) we have
g′P
(
−µ
(
W + b− 2b
e−4Wbβ + 1
))
= g′P (0) = 1,
7We notice that the conditions on the parameters are compatible, e.g., when E = 1. Indeed, in such case we
obtain dh ∈ (γ − 1, 1− c), and γ − 1 < 1− c is fulfilled since γ < (3− c)/2 < 2− c, as c ∈ (0, 1).
8We notice that the conditions on the parameters are consistent. Indeed, they are fulfilled, e.g., for c =
0.5, γ = 1.1, dh = 0.2 and E = 1.9. In such case we find ω3 = 0.936, ω2 = 0.986, and (7) is satisfied.
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while using (22) we can write
8b2βe−4Wbβ
(e−4Wbβ + 1)2
= 2β(b2 −W 2),
so that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at either SL or SH can be written as
 c + γ ωh −γωdµσ(1 + 2β(W 2 − b2)) 1− µσ(1 + 2β(W 2 − b2)) 0
1 0 0


Recalling (23), at S∗ we have W = 0, which provides (34), while at both SL and SH we have
W 2 > 0. Introducing
Ei = µσ(1 + 2β((W i)2 − b2)), i ∈ {L,H},
where WL and WH are defined using PL and PH into (23), respectively, we have that the
Jacobian matrices evaluated at the steady states are
J i =

 c + γ ωh −γωdEi 1− Ei 0
1 0 0

 , i ∈ {∗, L,H}, (44)
which are formally the same as J∗ in (34) provided that we replace E with Ei.
Thanks to the symmetry of SL and SH w.r.t. S∗ proved in Proposition 1 and by (23), for
the same parameters’ configuration we have WH = −WL, and hence EH = EL. From now on
we then only consider SH . We fix all parameters but β and, for clarity’s sake, we make explicit
the dependence of some quantities on β.
We want to show that for each β ∈ (0, 1/(2b2)) there is a unique βH ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞),
strictly decreasing as β increases, such that J∗(β) and JH(βH) have the same eigenvalues. To
this end, it suffices that E(β) = EH(βH), where E is defined in Proposition 4, namely that
βb2 = βH(b2 −WH(βH)2). (45)
By Propositions 1 and 2, we know that WH(βH), implicitly defined on (1/(2b2),+∞) by
(22), is an increasing function whose image is (0, b), so that we can rewrite (22) as βH =
1
4bWH (βH )
ln
(
b+WH (βH )
b−WH (βH )
)
, by means of which (45) can be recast into
βb2 =
ln
(
b+WH (βH )
b−WH (βH )
)
4bWH(βH)
(b2 − (WH(βH))2) =
ln
(
1+W˜H(βH )
1−W˜H(βH )
)
4W˜H(βH)
(1− (W˜H(βH))2),
where W˜H(βH) = WH(βH)/b. A straightforward check shows that function h : (0, 1) → R,
defined by
h(z) =
1
4z
ln
(
1 + z
1− z
)
(1− z2),
is a strictly decreasing function with limz→0+ h(z) = 1/2 and limz→1− h(z) = 0. This means
that equation h(z) = βb2 has exactly one solution z(β) ∈ (0, 1) for each β ∈ (0, 1/(2b2)).
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Moreover, z(β) is decreasing with respect to β. From W˜H(βH) = z(β) we obtain WH(βH) =
bz(β) ∈ (0, b), which, recalling that WH is increasing and its image is (0, b), proves that for
each β ∈ (0, 1/(2b2)) there is exactly one βH(β) ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞). Moreover, βH(β) is strictly
decreasing and limβ→0+ β
H(β) = +∞, limβ→(1/(2b2))− βH(β) = 1/(2b2). Through function βH(β)
we can easily translate each scenario for S∗ into a unique corresponding scenario for SH . For
instance, a destabilizing scenario for S∗ occurs if and only if the stability interval is Id = (0, βb)
with either βb < 1/(2b
2) or βb = 1/(2b
2). The image of Id through β
H(β) is then (βH(βb),+∞),
with either βH(βb) = 1/(2b
2) (unconditionally stable scenario) or βH(βb) > 1/(2b
2) (stabilizing
scenario). A mixed scenario for S∗ occurs if and only if the stability interval is Im = (βa, βb) with
either βb < 1/(2b
2) or βb = 1/(2b
2). The image of Im through β
H(β) is then (βH(βb), β
H(βb)),
with either βH(βb) = 1/(2b
2) (destabilizing scenario) or βH(βa) > 1/(2b
2) (mixed scenario).
The last case of unconditional stability is straightforward.
If we fix all the parameters and we study the behavior of the matrices in (44) and of
their eigenvalues on increasing ω, we can immediately note that J∗ = JH if we replace β ∈
(0, 1/(2b2)) with βH(β) ∈ (1/(2b2),+∞) via the strictly decreasing function ϕ : (0, 1/(2b2))→
(1/(2b2),+∞), β 7→ ϕ(β), whose existence has been shown along the proof. This allows con-
cluding.
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